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Divorce in the Entertainment Industry-
Some Special Problems
By OVVIE MILLER*
I
Introduction
This article is for the lawyer who has occasion to represent a
party to a divorce where the husband or wife works in the "en-
tertainment" industry. It is intended that its scope include, at
least, performers, creative talent and business people in mo-
tion pictures, television and the theater. Many, perhaps most,
of the legal and practical problems which arise in representing
a party in the entertainment industry are identical to those in
other businesses or professions. Yet, there are some issues
which are experienced with more frequency in the entertain-
ment industry context than others. For example, it is not un-
common for a person in the industry to have periods of very
high income alternating with periods of little or no income.
How should counsel and the courts deal with such a situation?
There may also be property interests acquired during the mar-
riage which are unique to the industry and which therefore re-
quire special treatment. Some of the recurring problems in the
latter, more unusual category of subjects, have been selected
for discussion in this article.
A word should be said about the orientation of the article.
The author has practiced in Beverly Hills, California, for some
twenty years and most of the examples and authorities are
taken from California practice. California is a community
property state,1 and many of the cases deal with the matter of
* Member of the Beverly Hills firm of Hertzberg, Childs, Miller & Corleto; B.A.,
University of California, Los Angeles, 1956; J.D., Harvard University, 1961. The author
acknowledges the valuable assistance in the preparation of this article of Edward J.
Szymanski, Jr., a third year student at UCLA Law School, and Mary Jean Freese of the
California Bar.
1. Community property is all real property situated in California and all personal
property wherever situated acquired during marriage while the spouses are domiciled
in California over which each spouse has equal management and control. CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 5110, 5125 (Deering 1979).
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"characterization," i.e., whether property (if an item is "prop-
erty" at all) is separate 2 or community in nature. Likewise,
California statutory and case criteria for determining fair ali-
mony (or in modern language "spousal support") or child sup-
port are best known to the author. Yet, many of the underlying
considerations in resolving these problems have general appli-
cation. And, where available to illustrate a point, New York au-
thorities are cited. Notions of "equitable" property division
and support orders which prevail in some jurisdictions are also
not far afield from the rationales articulated in the text authori-
ties. Accordingly, it is hoped that wherever they may practice,
lawyers with a matter involving a subject matter discussed
here will find the article helpful.
II
The Variable Income Problem
The nature of the entertainment industry is such that in
many respects it is a "feast or famine" existence. This season's
favorite talent, whether actor, director or the like, may be un-
able to secure employment in the next season. To a degree,
the self-employed person in any profession is susceptible to
variations in income. The roller-coaster effect is usually more
pronounced in the entertainment industry, however. The
problem is at least two-fold. First, how do the courts deal with
the matters of support where material variations in the sup-
porting party's income are substantiated? Second, what
should the attorney for the supported spouse do where such
variation is present (whether legitimately or as a result of
manipulation)?
A. The Manufactured Reduction in Income
Let us start with first principles. The court is empowered to
make an award of spousal and child support based upon the
supporting spouse's ability to earn money, plus the need of the
other spouse. It need not limit itself in fixing an appropriate
support sum to the actual income being generated by that
spouse at any given time. It appears from a review of the
cases, however, that this rule is usually applied when the rec-
2. Separate property is all property acquired prior to marriage or acquired after
marriage by gift, bequest or devise together with rents, issues and profits thereof. CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (Deering 1979).
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ord discloses that there has been a deliberate effort to avoid
any support obligation.
The California Supreme Court dealt with this problem of
spouses deliberately avoiding support obligations in Pencovic
v. Pencovic.3 There, the wife filed a proceeding to increase
child support. The record disclosed that the husband told the
wife at the time of the original divorce that he intended to plan
his life so that he would be "protected. ' 4 The husband carried
out his plan. Shortly after the divorce, he changed his name to
"Krishna Venta" and founded a religious society called the
"W.K.F.L."'  Defendant became the spiritual leader or
"Master" of the society. Neither he nor anyone else received a
salary as such from the society. The society operated on com-
munal lines with food, housing, clothing and medical care pro-
vided by the society for the benefit of the members. The
society paid for all of the husband's expenses, including court-
ordered child support.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
award of an increase in child support despite defendant's con-
tention that he had neither money, property nor earnings and
that he was therefore without ability to pay the increased
amounts. Although the husband claimed that the support he
received from the society was only a gift to him for services
gratuitously rendered, the California Supreme Court ruled
that the trial court reasonably concluded that he was, in fact,
receiving compensation for services as "Master." The society
had measured the amount of the husband's compensation by
the husband's needs, including his obligation to support his
children; accordingly, the California Supreme Court believed
that the trial court could reasonably consider and conclude
that the amount of the husband's compensation would be in-
creased to meet any additional obligation imposed upon him.6
Even if the support husband received was viewed as a "gift"
and the society would not provide him with additional funds to
pay the increased support order, the Supreme Court found no
3. 45 Cal. 2d 97, 287 P.2d 501 (1955).
4. He intended to "'form this organization where people would give all their pos-
sessions into the organization and he would be the head of the organization, nothing
would be in his name, everything would be in the name of the organization, yet he
would have them arrange for all the money he wanted to use any time he wanted it."
287 P.2d at 503.
5. The letters stand for wisdom, knowledge, faith and love. 287 P.2d at 503.
6. 287 P.2d at 504.
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abuse of discretion. Indeed, it said clearly that the trial court
could have reasonably concluded that the defendant had the
earning capability to discharge the obligation of the support
award, and that he could not evade that obligation by refusing
to seek or accept gainful employment for religious reasons.7
California courts have articulated the underlying rationale of
Pencovic of disallowing evasions of support obligations in a
number of reported cases, both before and after that decision.8
New York law is consistent with the California cases. In
Doscher v. Doscher,9 the husband sought a downward modifica-
tion of alimony and child support payments due to a substan-
tial change in his financial condition. The trial court granted a
7. Although the guarantee of religious freedom of the First Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States is binding on the states under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth . . . the states may nevertheless regulate
conduct for the protection of society, and insofar as such regulations are di-
rected towards a proper end and are not discriminatory, they may indirectly
affect religious activities without infringing the constitutional guarantee ....
Certainly there are few interests of greater importance to the state than the
proper discharge by parents of their duties to their children, and the Constitu-
tion does not compel the subordination of the statutory duty of a parent to
support his child to a rule of religious conduct prohibiting gainful
employment.
287 P.2d at 504.
8. See, e.g., Webber v. Webber, 33 Cal. 2d 153, 199 P.2d 934 (1948); Tompkins v.
Tompkins, 83 Cal. App. 2d 71, 187 P.2d 840 (1947) (refusing to secure or take a job);
Clark v. Clark, 193 Cal. App. 2d 565, 14 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1961) (deliberately not applying
oneself to a business); Elliott v. Elliott, 162 Cal. App. 3d 460, 328 P.2d 291 (1958) (inten-
tionally depressing one's income to an artificial low). For an illustration of the "ability
to earn" theory applied in an instance where there was no finding of deliberate avoid-
ance, see In re Wyatt, 159 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1979). In denying hearing, the California
Supreme Court ordered that the opinion not be officially published. There, the appel-
late court determined that the trial court had fairly used the "ability to earn" standard
in fixing spousal support where the husband's businesses were of a widely fluctuating
nature with profits determined by a four-to-five year cycle in shipping rates, where
determination of what was husband's income and what was capital replenishment of
businesses that were losing money was a difficult matter, and the husband, contrary to
his claim, had not retired from the business.
9. 438 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1981). The appellate court declared, "Here, the evidence indi-
cated that the drastic reduction in earnings is attributable to petitioner's own behavior.
At the time of the divorce he earned in the neighborhood of $25,000 per year. At the
time of the hearing, he allegedly earned $7,800 per year operating a clothing store for
his mother. Petitioner admitted that there were other jobs that he could have had but
they were not at the $25,000 level ... The record indicates that petitioner is capable of
earning more than $7,800 a year. Moreover, a family business is involved here and it
appears that petitioner had some input in fixing his own salary." 438 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
"Family Court, in reducing the alimony and support payments so drastically in these
circumstances, abused its discretion. The order reducing alimony and support pay-
ments should be reversed and the original order directing such payments reinstated."
Id.
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reduction of approximately fifty percent of the support pay-
ments. The appellate court reversed that order on the ground
that the husband could control his own earning level and that
the proper amount of support payment is not determined by a
spouse's current economic situation, but by a spouse's ability
to provide.
In comparison to cases involving clearly manufactured de-
creases in income, courts have been more sympathetic to sup-
porting spouses whose variations in income are more
legitimate. The husband in Philbin v. Philbin' was earning
$55,000 per year in 1968 when he entered into a property settle-
ment agreement with his wife. His income rose to $95,000 when
the interlocutory and final judgments of divorce were entered
the following year. At that time, he was receiving $55,000 under
a contract of employment on the Joey Bishop television show
and $40,000 for outside television appearances. In 1970, in light
of the husband's reduced income ($27,000 per year), the trial
court reduced his spousal and child support obligations from
$1,300 per month to $550 per month plus a loan of $350 per
month to be paid to assist the wife in making payments on her
home. The $350 sum was to be credited against subsequent
support payments. The trial court's modification was to last for
only six months, at which time the original $1,300 support order
would be revived. The wife appealed from the modification on
the ground that the trial court abused its discretion.
The appellate court upheld the reduction in support based
on the record. It reasoned that there were fluctuations in in-
come in the entertainment industry and that it would be unfair
to require the husband to deplete the savings from the divorce
settlement while the wife failed to conserve her resources.1
10. 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1971).
11. There is no question but that the amount ordered for spousal and child
support is considerably less than that claimed by petitioner to be her neces-
sary monthly expenses, and that the amount of income remaining for living
expenses of respondent and his family is much less than his listed monthly
expenses, but for whatever additional he needs for his own support he must
resort to his savings. It appears that the court below in fixing the amount of
support for petitioner and the minors considered the nature of respondent's
work and its uncertainties and was unwilling to require respondent, while still
employed, to further deplete his savings which consist primarily of the $28,000
he received in settlement at the time of the divorce and prudently conserved.
Obviously the loan of $350 per month for the six-month period was meant to
come from respondent's savings and it is that money petitioner is ordered to
repay. In contrast with respondent's preservation of his part of the commu-
nity property, petitioner apparently did little to conserve the monies she re-
COMM/ENT L. J.
The wife then argued that the trial court should have denied
modification because its orders need not be based upon actual
income or property of the husband, but should be based upon
his ability to earn money. 2 The appellate court decided that
the "ability to earn" rule is only applied where there has been
a deliberate attempt to avoid support responsibilities. Nothing
in the record supported the notion that Mr. Philbin had done
anything to deliberately depress his income. The so-called
Philbin rule of basing support on the ability to earn was thus
created.1
3
The appellate court then raised a matter not argued by either
party-the propriety of limiting the reduced support payment
to six months.
If the record supports such limitation, of course an order of
this kind is proper, but the restoration of the original payments
in six months is here based on a finding of a reasonable expec-
tation that in the near future respondent's finances will rise to
their former level ($55,000 in 1968, $95,000 in 1969), [which] is
wholly unsupported by the evidence. Implicit in the order of
September 22, 1970, and specifically recited in the order of Oc-
tober 6, 1970, is the finding "that it is reasonable to expect the
respondent to resume his former financial situation in the near
future." Nothing in the record supports this finding; nothing
gives hope that respondent's efforts will yield more income in
ceived; she elected to make a $15,000 down payment on a house and an
investment of $9,000 which she lost. Petitioner is now burdened with monthly
mortgage payments of $447 on the house, and while she cannot necessarily be
faulted for the purchase of the home in the light of her custody of the two
minors, nevertheless the court below may be justified in its concern, recited in
the order of October 6, 1970, 'as to whether it is reasonable for the petitioner to
maintain her home based on the present situation of the parties.' Respon-
dent's income is derived solely from the entertainment industry which he tes-
tified 'seems to be a bit depressed this year.' Income in this field fluctuates
considerably from year to year and a change in respondent's standard of living
may well be in the offing; this applies as well to petitioner and the minors
unless she is willing, despite her asserted nervous condition, to obtain
employment.
96 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
12. Pencovic v. Pencovic, 45 Cal. 2d 97, 287 P.2d 501 (1955).
13. The Philbin rule was followed in the case of In re Reese, 73 Cal. App. 3d 120, 140
Cal. Rptr. 589 (1977). There, the husband was a musician who worked with a group
approximately two days a week, earning $250 per month. He appealed from an order
requiring him to pay $195 per month in child support. The appellate court reversed the
order and stated that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the husband's
income level was the result of an attempt to avoid responsibilities. "Here husband's
earning power is limited by the nature of the entertainment field in which he makes
his living." 73 Cal. App. 3d at 125, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
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the near future or by April 1, 1971. To the contrary, it shows
that his contract has only six weeks to run with no job offer in
the future. His employment status is undisputed. Hired by
KHJ-TV under a 13-week contract, respondent at the time of
the hearing had six more weeks employment thereunder; the
contract had three additional 13-week options (for what salary
the record is silent) which had not been exercised by the em-
ployer and the evidence reflects no expectation that it will do
so; it is an exclusive contract 'for Los Angeles television' Mon-
day through Friday; his agent has been unable to secure other
employment for him while under the contract and he has per-
formed no outside television engagements, although he earned
$2,000 or $3,000 from other employment; his contract permits
him to take television or other employment outside Los Ange-
les with the approval of KHJ but inasmuch as its terms require
him to work Monday through Friday, he cannot take television
engagements out of town or one-night stands. Respondent has
had no job offers for the future. Respondent testified, and it is
not denied, that this year the industry is depressed. His high
peak earning of 1969 was due to a $55,000 contract for employ-
ment on the Joey Bishop show and $40,000 he was able to earn
from outside television appearances. The latter sum was ex-
plained by him thus, "When you are on national television you
do get more offers than when you are not." Because now he
appears on a local station and for the reasons hereinabove set
forth, it is not likely under his present contract that defendant
will be able to supplement his income. It may well be that in
fact KHJ-TV has exercised the options under the contract and
defendant is now earning more than at the time of the hearing,
through increased salary under the contract itself and/or other
employment, but nothing in the record before us reflects even
an anticipation of such. Even so, the court cannot anticipate
what may possibly happen in the future or provide for future
contingencies in making an order but is limited to the facts and
circumstances existing at the time the same is made .... In
the absence of anything in the record to support a "reasonable"
expectation that respondent will resume his former financial
situation in the near future, the termination of the reduced
support payments on April 1, 1971, is predicated on the grossest
kind of speculation. While there appears to be no abuse of dis-
cretion in the reduction of support payments, we conclude for
the foregoing reasons that the court abused its discretion in or-
dering the restoration of the original payments on April 1,
1971.14
14. 96 Cal. Rptr. at 412-413.
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One may now ask whether there is any special protection ac-
corded by the courts to the paying party in these variable in-
come cases. Will a Mr. Philbin forever be insulated from the
prospect of an increase in support if the supported spouse is
ignorant of any improvement in the supporting spouse's eco-
nomic fortunes? Probably not, if the approach in In re Rome 15
and In re Hurtienne 16 is followed.
In the Rome case, the husband brought a spousal modifica-
tion proceeding three months after he had stipulated to an
award of $1,000 per month. The husband had been a successful
commission salesman of a specialty product for the same firm
for many years, grossing about $50,000 per year. He was termi-
nated from the firm and at the time of the modification hearing
was receiving $483 per month, mostly from unemployment
compensation. The trial court reduced the support obligation
to $100 per month and established a sliding scale of future sup-
port payments to the wife commensurate with future increases
in the husband's income. At the conclusion of the hearing,
counsel for the wife requested the court to make an interim
order only and to continue the hearing for ninety days. This
request was denied. The appellate court reversed that decision
because there was a basis in the record for the trial court not to
have accepted the husband's explanation of his lack of employ-
ment so readily. 7 Under the circumstances, the trial court's re-
15. 109 Cal. App. 3d 961, 167 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1980).
16. 126 Cal. App. 3d 374, 178 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1981).
17. According to Richard, and his testimony was undisputed, he was fired
without just cause. At the hearing, he testified that he was currently maintain-
ing an office and looking for work. Richard, whose field of expertise was highly
specialized, testified that he was well regarded within the industry and felt it
was not in his best interests to accept the offers that had come his way in that
they were from, as he described them, 'fly-by-night' companies. However, at
the time of the hearing he had what he considered a good opportunity, inci-
dent to which the merchandise would not be available until December.
In the instant case, the record reveals that not only was the respondent hus-
band unemployed at the time of the hearing but also that the appellant was
not destitute in that she was possessed of assets. While this might lead us to
conclude that the order, which was interim in the sense that a sliding scale
schedule provided for increased payments to Naomi in the event of enhanced
future earnings on the part of Richard, was within the court's discretion, the
matter is not so easily resolved.
Richard had left Naomi and was living with another woman who apparently
had substantial earning power. He also had assets as a result of the division of
community property which he was using as a source of support. With respect
to his termination, he testified, in effect, that there was no good cause for
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fusal to continue the matter for ninety days to reassess the
husband's efforts to find work and the court's order establish-
ing a sliding scale of payments contingent upon husband's
earnings denied the wife the opportunity to invoke the Philbin
rule that an obligation to support can be based on ability to
earn, rather than on actual earnings. The decision of the trial
court, therefore, was an abuse of discretion. 18
Rounding out the cases in this area is In re Hurtienne19
where the interlocutory decree ordered the husband to pay
spousal support of $400 per month commencing April 1, 1980.
Included in the award was the provision that "Petitioner [hus-
band] having been terminated from his long-term employment
by Rockwell on January 18, 1980, without cause on the part of
petitioner, the previous temporary order [for support in the
sum of $375 per month] is in effect only through the spousal
support installment payable on February 15, 1980. "20 No reason
was given by the trial court for the 30-day moratorium on
spousal support. The appellate court assumed that this was
the way the trial court impliedly informed the husband that he
had thirty days to obtain employment, thus justifying the $400
award order. The husband, citing Philbin, argued on appeal
that an award based on his ability to earn rather than on his
actual income, when he was discharged without fault, was er-
ror. The appellate court agreed and concluded that a realistic
approach to the problem would have been similar to that sug-
gested in In re Rome .21 The trial court should have determined
all of the other issues involved in the dissolution proceeding
same. The court obviously accepted this explanation and, as is clear from the
nature of its order, respondent's good faith .... [TIhe application of...
[Philbin ] is dependent upon a showing that husband is, in effect, acting in bad
faith by either refusing work or engaging in other conduct designed to reduce
his income. While the evidence adduced at the hearing was not sufficient to
invoke Philbin, certainly it was sufficient to at least cause the court to enter-
tain some doubt about the genuineness of respondent's efforts.
167 Cal. Rptr. at 352-353.
18. The order of the court left the matter of support, aside from the question of
a change in appellant's circumstance, entirely in the control of respondent.
The very real potential for injustice to a recipient spouse inherent in -an order
providing a schedule for a sliding scale as to spousal support, especially where
the husband's earnings are entirely based on commission, as contrasted with a
salary, constitutes, in our opinion, an abuse of discretion.
167 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
19. 126 Cal. App. 3d 374, 178 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1981).
20. Id.
21. 109 Cal. App. 3d 961, 167 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1980).
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and then continued the issue of spousal support for a reason-
able time to permit the facts concerning the husband's good
faith attempt to find work to materialize.22
The message is becoming clear. Where the supporting
spouse claims a cessation or material reduction in income from
employment, counsel for the supported party should seek a
reservation of jurisdiction or hearing continuance for a Philbin
type proceeding. In this way a better assessment of the bona
fides, duration and implications of a claimed income reduction
can be achieved.
Having established a legal basis for the monitoring of the
fluctuating income situation, it may now be helpful to review
some of the procedures to assist counsel and the court in arriv-
ing at a fair support level in these cases. Of course, the fluctu-
ating income situation may exist at the outset of a dissolution
of marriage proceeding or at any later time. The discussion
which follows should have application at any stage when the
issue is presented.
B. Establishing the Ability to Pay
Where the supporting spouse is self-employed, counsel's
greatest need is information. A salary or "draw" may repre-
sent only a fraction of the cash available to meet support
needs. The cash flow of a business may permit a spouse to use
money for personal expenses which may even be deducted by
the business for tax purposes, but the individual tax returns
may not reflect that cash flow. The point needs no belaboring.
It is important to retain an accountant with instructions to
make a cash flow analysis of the business and personal ac-
counts of the parties. The period of time covered in this task
should be a minimum of three years-preferably more. In this
way, the peaks and valleys of the fluctuating income cycle may
be covered.
22. The court perhaps thought it was doing this when it gave Ronald 30 days of
suspended payments before the $400 per month spousal support commenced.
However, we do not believe this delay was realistic under the facts of this case.
Ronald received notice of the court's intentions only through its Memorandum
of Intended Decision. If Ronald, acting in good faith, had not found employ-
ment in 30 days, the spousal support automatically commenced even though
Ronald had no other income to pay the award. The better approach would
have been to make no spousal support award and to order the parties back for
a Philbin hearing.
178 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
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The accountants' expert testimony at the pendente lite hear-
ing for temporary support, trial or later modification hearing
should be supported by a written report and schedules, all of
which should be offered into evidence. In a general sense, the
presentation of the accountant concerning a self-employed
spouse will be made in order to establish a net average
monthly income for each year over a period of years. The net
income will be determined by calculating the gross annual re-
ceipts less both the appropriate business or professional ex-
penses and income taxes. In formula terms, the equation is as
follows:
Gross Receipts - (Business/Professional
Expenses and state and
Net Income = federal income taxes)
12
An average taken in this form for each of the three (or more)
years considered should reveal a fair monthly sum available
for the combined support needs of the parties. Naturally,
special care must be taken in analyzing the reasonableness of
the business or professional expenses reviewed and the
character of the gross receipts (e.g., are there non-recurring
items such as capital gains?).
We have assumed so far that the divorce proceeding is a
substantial matter, warranting the employment of an
accountant in making an analysis. Where, in counsel's opinion,
the matter does not warrant such an expense, it has been
recommended23 that an "apparent" cash flow presentation be
made in the following way:
1. Present in evidence any company or professional financial
statements reflecting the net profit that has not been with-
drawn from the business by the party from whom support
is sought.
2. Add back to net profit deductions taken for tax purposes
that did not entail cash expenditures (e.g., depreciation).
3. Present in evidence all checks paid to the supporting
spouse (whether salary, bonuses, draws, expense reim-
bursement or otherwise) for the relevant period. A sched-
ule of these items would be helpful in the presentation.
4. Present in evidence the monthly bank statements for the
relevant period showing the deposits and balances main-
23. California Continuing Education of the Bar, Representing Clients in Spousal
and Child Support Proceedings, June/July 1975, at 53-54.
No. 11
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tained in each bank or savings account maintained by the
employed party.
It should be noted that this method does not result in a
"true" cash flow determination. For example, it would not re-
veal payments made by the business on credit charges attribu-
table to the employed party's personal expenses. Yet, where
counsel is not able to present a thorough cash flow analysis by
an accounting expert, the evidence adduced should be suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie cash flow presentation. It
would be incumbent upon the opposing party to demonstrate
where the figures vary from a presentation of actual cash flow.
Thus, while a variable income situation can complicate the
determination of a fair support order, it is not an impossible
hurdle to overcome. Given enough factual data, the legal tools
exist to assist the court and counsel in arriving at an equitable
result.
III
Characterization and Valuation of
Particular Assets
A. The Right of Publicity
The public is increasingly aware of the tremendous financial
gain achievable from commercial exploitation of famous per-
sonalities. Using various theories, such as unfair competition,
copyright and quasi-contract, both courts and legislatures have
recognized and enforced a right to exploit this right of publicity
of name and likeness. 24 In light of this valuable publicity right,
the attorneys for the celebrity and the non-celebrity spouse
both share a concern in determining the nature of the parties'
interest in this right.
Consider the following hypothetical situation. An unmarried
actor works for a local television station in Los Angeles, per-
forming the principal role in a "soap opera." After two years of
broadcasts, the show and the actor have developed a substan-
tial local following. The actor is hired for a national television
version of the show aired from Los Angeles by CBS Television.
He marries. Within three months the show begins to enjoy in-
creasing national popularity. An enterprising businessman
24. See, e.g., CAL. CIrv. CODE § 3344 (Deerings 1979) and N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW
§§ 550, 551 (McKinney 1976).
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identifies the actor as a rising television "star" and uses the
actor's likeness on a "celebrity calendar." No consent for the
use is secured. Sales of the calendar are phenomenal, and the
profits are substantial. The actor immediately sues in the Los
Angeles Superior Court, and a $200,000 settlement is negoti-
ated. At the same time the actor and his wife agree that their
short marriage has been a mistake and seek a dissolution of
the marriage. The question presented in the divorce is
whether the proceeds of the settlement are community prop-
erty or simply separate property of the actor. If community
property, the proceeds are subject to equal division in the pro-
ceeding for dissolution of the marriage.25
A threshold question regarding the nature of the right of
publicity must be asked. What is the nature of the right? Is it a
property right or one grounded in tort law? The question has
evoked different answers over the years.
The notion of "privacy" was introduced by Brandeis and
Warren in their seminal law review article in 1890.26 The au-
thors conceived of privacy as the protectible right to be "let
alone." A modern analysis of the subject by Prosser catego-
rized privacy law into four classifications: first, intrusion into
personal matter or solitude; second, public disclosure of pri-
vate matter; third, portraying a person in a false light; and
fourth, misappropriation of a person's name or likeness for a
commercial purpose. 7
The proprietary character of the fourth category described
by Prosser has been carried over by some courts to a separate
or independent property right. In Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc.,28 the defendant sold licenses to use the name and like-
ness of the deceased comedy team of Laurel and Hardy for
commercial purposes. The widows of the comedians brought
suit. The court held that the right of publicity was a "property"
right, which was assignable during life and descendible. The
court distinguished the cases involving "privacy," where the in-
jury involved the feelings of the individuals concerned. In
those cases, termination of protection for the right made sense.
25. It is also possible, of course, that the proceeds may have both a separate and
community property character.
26. Brandeis & Warren, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L REV. 193 (1890).
27. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); see also Kapellas v. Kofman, 1
Cal. 3d 20, 35 n.16, 8 Cal. Rptr. 360, 369 n.16 (1969).
28. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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But where the interests of celebrities are purely commercial,
the court found no logical reason to terminate the right upon
death.
In New York, the right of publicity of Elvis Presley has been
held to have survived his death.29 Likewise, the California
Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a right of pub-
licity. The Court, however, has ruled in Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures3' that the right does not survive the celebrity's death,
and it has described as "pointless" the issue whether the right
sounds in tort or property. There, suit was brought by the
widow and surviving son of the movie actor Bela Lugosi. Lu-
gosi had played the title role in the 1930 film "Dracula." His
wife and son later sought to recover profits made by Universal
Pictures in its licensing of the Count Dracula character to com-
mercial firms and to enjoin further license grants without
plaintiffs' consent. The California Supreme Court held four to
three that the right to exploit name and likeness is personal to
the artist and must be exercised, if at all, during his lifetime.'
One may reasonably agree or disagree with the view of the
majority in Lugosi that for purposes of deciding the issue of
survivability, it is pointless to consider whether the right to ex-
ploit name and likeness is "property." It is surely not point-
less, however, to consider that question in the context of a
divorce. If the nature of the interest in protecting and exploit-
ing name and likeness is derived solely from the notion of "pri-
29. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978) and Factors v.
Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
30. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
31. Assignment of the right to exploit name and likeness by the "owner"
thereof is synonymous with its exercise. In all of the above cases the oumer of
the right did assign it in his lifetime and, too, Lugosi did precisely this in his
lifetime when he assigned his name and likeness to Universal for exploitation
in connection with the picture Dracula . .. Assertion by the heirs of the right
to exploit their predecessor's name and likeness to commercial situations he
left unexploited simply is not the exercise of that right by the person entitled
to it. Thus, whether or not the right sounds in tort or property, and we think
with Dean Prosser that a debate over this issue is pointless, what is at stake is
the question whether this right is or ought to be personal.
If rights to the exploitation of artistic or intellectual property never exer-
cised during the lifetime of their creators were to survive their death, neither
society's interest in the free dissemination of ideas nor the artist's rights to the
fruits of his own labor would be served. Authority, as noted, supports the
strong policy considerations which underlie the conclusion that the right is
personal.
160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
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vacy," then it would appear to be an interest grounded in tort
law. If so, under California law, such characterization would
likely have as a consequence that money received as compen-
sation for an invasion of such privacy right would (except in
limited cases) be awarded solely to the "injured" spouse upon
a divorce.2 No equivalent award of property would be made to
the other spouse. On the other hand, if the right of publicity is
proprietary in character, that is, if its essence is "property,"
then to the extent that such property is generated as a result of
the efforts of a spouse during marriage, it should be divisible
upon a divorce as community property.33
The reality of the entertainment world is that the interest of
its members in promoting (or protecting) their "right of public-
ity" is, by and large, solely commercial in nature. This fact is
simple recognition that there is in the marketplace a pecuniary
worth to the "right" which is substantially affected by the abil-
ity to grant (or refuse) exclusive use to the same. Is this any
less a "property" right than the property right resulting from
the patent and copyright laws?
34
There are, of course, a number of other problems associated
with the notion of dealing with the right of publicity as a divisi-
ble community property asset. For example, if it is an asset, is
it too intangible for division in a divorce context? The courts
have recognized that "goodwill" of a lawyer, doctor or other
professional is not too intangible to be identified as a commu-
nity property asset or to be valued.3
Is the "right of publicity" more evanescent than "goodwill"?
Perhaps. The hypothetical example posed at the beginning of
this section avoids a valuation issue by presenting the asset as
having an established settlement value. But suppose there
were no such benchmark. Suppose the celebrity had not yet
32. In the area of tort law in this context, injuries are categorized into personal
injuries during marriage and damages received while married, and personal injuries
during marriage and damages received after separation. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5126,
4800(c) apply to damages received during marriage.
33. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107, 5108, 5110 (Deering 1979).
34. The United States Supreme Court found such an analogy in supporting a right
of publicity claim in the "Human Cannonball" case, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-577 (1977).
35. See, e.g., Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969); In re
Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974); Miller, Valuing the Goodwill of a
Professional Practice, 50 CAL. ST. BJ. 107 (1975). The analogy to goodwill has been
noted in a comprehensive student note, see Comment, Community Property Interests
in the Right of Publicity: Fame and/or Fortune, 25 U.C.LA. L. REV. 1095, 1116 (1978).
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succeeded in exploiting his "right" at the time of the divorce, or
suppose the celebrity recoiled from ever exploiting his or her
fame and simply wanted to be left alone. Must he or she be
judicially forced to buy back from the other spouse his or her
community interest in a right never exercised or to be exer-
cised? It has been suggested that there are a number of ways
to evaluate this asset, with the most readily adaptable being a
market value determination without deduction for any re-
straints on exploitation which the celebrity might impose.36
The hypothetical example also suggests yet another prob-
lem. How does one determine whether the asset had its source
in separate or community origins? The example suggests that
there may have to be a tracing"7 or allocation of some kind be-
tween the premarital (separate property) component and that
resulting from the marital (community property) efforts. That
exercise is bound to present formidable difficulties, not the
least of which is persuading a trial court that there is a credible
basis for making such an allocation.
While persuasive arguments may be advanced by counsel in
favor of treating the right of publicity as a divisible marital as-
set in appropriate cases, it appears that substantial barriers re-
main in dealing with the concept in that manner.
B. Executive Goodwill
There has been a steady enlargement of the concept of com-
munity "goodwill" which can be identified in the cases. From a
consideration of the concept only in commercial businesses,
there has been a recognition that goodwill, divisible upon a di-
vorce, may also exist in a professional practice or business
even though one may be dealing with the personal skill of an
individual practitioner or businessman.38
Consider the following situation: An executive employee of
a motion picture company develops an excellent reputation for
business acumen and ability in the development and produc-
tion of feature films for his company. His separation from his
36. See Comment, supra note 35, at 1120.
37. Contra, In re McDonald, 52 Cal. App. 3d 509 (1975); In re Olhausen, 48 Cal. App.
3d 190 (1975) (no tracing was allowed).
38. See, e.g., Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956) (dental
laboratory business); In re Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973) (physi-
cian-partner); and Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1962)
(lawyer). See also, Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Marital Dissolution, 52 CAL.
S.BJ. 27 (1977) where it is argued that goodwill is not community property at divorce.
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wife coincides with the negotiation of a very substantial com-
pensation and ownership "package" with a new film company,
where he can operate with greater freedom and autonomy than
under his former employer. The claim is made by wife's coun-
sel that the arrangement with the new company was made pos-
sible by the "executive goodwill" developed in the motion
picture industry by the husband during his marriage. Indeed,
it is argued, the new film company was in reality buying the
executive's goodwill in the industry when it offered the hus-
band the deal that he accepted. Hence, it is claimed, this is a
community property asset, subject to valuation by determining
the consideration granted to the husband in the new business
deal.
A brief on wife's behalf, filed in a recent Los Angeles Supe-
rior Court divorce proceeding, made the point that in the en-
tertainment industry particularly, an individual's skill,
judgment, personality, and reputation are crucial in negotiat-
ing a contractual arrangement. It follows that the husband's
goodwill in the motion picture industry developed during his
marriage to the wife and this goodwill enabled him to obtain
the sums he demanded from his new employer.
The husband's opposing brief pointed out that in all of the
authorities cited on wife's behalf, the spouse for whom good-
will was found had a proprietary interest in the practice or
business involved. Therefore, the husband argued that for le-
gal purposes there is no goodwill of an employee of a business.
The case of Golden State Linen Service, Inc. v. Vidalin39 was
cited for the proposition that the goodwill of a business may
not be owned by anyone other than the owner of a business.
Husband's counsel also contended that (up to the time of trial
at least) the California courts had uniformly rejected the no-
tion that an increase in "skill, talent and reputation" during
marriage constitutes a community property asset. Counsel
analogized the wife's claim to claims in which the appellate
court rejected the notion that the acquisition of a legal educa-
tion and law degree during marriage constituted a divisible
community property asset. °
California law ostensibly proscribes the use of any method
which depends upon post-marital efforts to evaluate commu-
39. 69 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1977).
40. See note 45 and accompanying text, infra.
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nity property goodwill.4 Husband's counsel argued that the
real value of his increase in job-related skill and reputation lay
in the potential for increase in his earnings-and future earn-
ings were his, alone, under California law. The trial court de-
termined that there was no community executive goodwill. As
of the writing of this article, no appeal had been filed.
The decision rendered in In re Sullivan4 may bring about a
different result, however. Sullivan involved a couple whose
marriage began while both parties were in college. After grad-
uation, the husband went to medical school, and the wife went
to work to support the two of them. The wife continued to sup-
port her husband throughout medical school and during his in-
ternship. During the tenth year of marriage, the parties
separated and subsequently the husband set up his practice.
The community property at the time of separation consisted
only of some used furniture and two automobiles, not com-
pletely paid for. The wife was not allowed to introduce evi-
dence relative to the value of the husband's medical education
and degree. She argued on appeal that the professional educa-
tion, degree and license to practice which the husband ac-
quired during the marriage were community property.
The court initially noted the distinction between a character-
ization of an item of property and a determination that the
community has a financial interest in such property. Even if
an item of property is characterized as separate property of
one of the spouses, the community may nevertheless have a
financial interest in such property. Although any "property"
interest in an education, degree, or license to practice, by its
nature, is the separate property of its possessor and cannot be
characterized as community property, in California, if an in-
crease in the value of separate property is attributable to the
ability or activity of either spouse, that increase in value is or-
dinarily considered to be the property of the community.
The court was unable to see any distinction between the use
of community funds and effort to increase the value of separate
assets (such as residence, business or a professional practice)
and the expenditure of such resources to acquire a profes-
sional education, degree, and license to practice a profession.
Accordingly, a two-pronged holding was rendered. First, ab-
41. In re Fortier, 4 Cal. App. 3d 384, 389, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (1973).
42. 82 Daily Journal DA.R. 157 (C.A. 4th January 8, 1982).
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sent an agreement to the contrary, where the community has
not received any real economic benefit from the acquisition by
one of the parties of an education, degree or professional li-
cense during the marriage, the community should, at mini-
mum, be reimbursed for the amount of any community funds
that were expended to acquire the education, degree or li-
cense. Otherwise, a spouse in the husband's situation would
walk away from a marriage with a "windfall" that might have
great value. Second, when during a marriage there has been
an ascertainable increase in the value of an education, degree,
or license to practice and the community has not previously
benefited from it, the community possesses a pro tanto inter-
est in the appreciation in value which occurred during the
marriage.
The court dismissed the husband's argument that the value
of the interest in the education, degree, and license is incapa-
blp of determination. Similar difficulties in valuing the com-
munity interest in the earnings of a separate property
business, the goodwill of a business or professional practice,
and in unvested pension benefits, have not precluded evalua-
tion. Not every professional education, degree, or license to
practice necessarily has an economic value nor will the com-
munity always be determined to have a financial interest in the
same. But, where the issue is raised, the trial court must make
a specific finding on the merits whether an education, degree
or professional license first acquired during a marriage has any
economic value and, if so, what the community's interest
should be determined to be. The appellate court left open the
approach to the problem and indicated that any formula which
would achieve substantial justice and equity between the par-
ties would be upheld.
The court in Sullivan suggested various methods to make
the required determination. For example, the court might
compare the income of the holder of the license within a rea-
sonable period after the acquisition of the license to that per-
son's income immediately before the acquisition. Another
method would be to determine the actual expenditure of com-
munity funds plus community hours expended. Further, the
court might determine the value of the loss of income to the
community that resulted from one of the spouses attending
professional school rather than being employed full-time at a
COMM/ENT L. .
job for which the spouse was qualified without having the ben-
efit of the professional education.
In fashioning its new remedy, the court distinguished both
the Todd v. Todd43 and In re Aufmuth" cases in which the ap-
pellate court stated:
The value of a legal education lies in the potential for increase
in the future earning capacity of the acquiring spouse made
possible by the law degree and innumerable other factors and
conditions which contribute to the development of a successful
law practice. A determination that such an "asset" is commu-
nity property would require a division of post-dissolution earn-
ings to the extent that they are attributable to the law degree,
even though such earnings are by definition the separate prop-
erty of the acquiring spouse. As the court observed in In re
Marriage of Fortier (1973) 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 388 [109 Cal.
Rptr. 914]: "Since the philosophy of the community property
system is that a community interest can be acquired only dur-
ing the time of the marriage, it would then be inconsistent with
that philosophy to assign to any community interest the value
of the post-marital efforts of either spouse."4
The facts considered significant by the court in Sullivan were
that very little community property was acquired by the par-
ties during their marriage and that no showing was made by
the wife regarding her entitlement to spousal support.46
For performers, executives, and creative talent (and their
spouses), the prospect seems assured that continuing efforts
will be made to encompass goodwill or a like concept in the
characterization and evaluation of the property subject to divi-
sion upon a divorce. The very substantial values likely to be
assigned to such an asset makes that prospect even more
certain.
C. "Play or Pay" and Other Contractual Arrangements
1. Carroll Baker
Jack Garfein, a motion picture director, assisted his actress-
43. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
44. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
45. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
46. On August 2, 1982, the court of appeals reversed itself and held that a spouse
who works to put the other through professional school has no interest in the profes-
sional's education, degree or license. It ruled, among other things that these items are
not property, much less community property. On October 28, 1982, the California
Supreme Court granted a hearing in the case.
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wife, Carroll Baker, in negotiating a "play or pay" contract for
her with Paramount Pictures. Under that contract she ap-
peared in the picture "Harlow." The contract entitled Para-
mount to Baker's services for at least one picture a year for six
additional years starting in 1966. Paramount was obligated to
pay Baker during those years whether or not she was called to
work. Paramount did not call on Baker to appear in any pic-
tures after "Harlow" was completed. Suit was filed, resulting
in a judgment declaring the obligation of Paramount to comply
with the "pay" provision of the contract. Paramount then com-
menced payments. In the divorce proceeding, it was held,
among other things, that as a matter of law the payments re-
ceived by Baker from Paramount after the parties separated in
1967 were her separate property. Garfein appealed.
The appellate court affirmed.' It stated that under the terms
of the contract, Baker had to hold herself available for service
in at least one picture a year, and without Paramount's consent
she could not accept other potentially conflicting engagements.
Provisions of the California Civil Code (now section 5118) then
provided that the "earnings" of the wife after separation are
separate property. Garfein, however, argued that the pay-
ments in question were not "earnings" because Baker was en-
titled to them even if she did not work, that is, appear in any
film.
The appellate court answered Garfein's argument by point-
ing out that appearance in a picture was only one aspect of her
obligation to her employer under the contract. Under a "play
or pay" contract, the employer secures (1) an option on the
performer's services; and (2) the assurance that a performer
will not, without its consent, create competition for other pic-
tures of the employer by performing for some other producer.49
The performer earns his or her compensation by refraining
from performing for anyone except the employer during the
period of the contract, unless the employer consents. Because
the payments made after the date of separation were thus
earned in the post-separation period, the court held that such
payments were separate property. 0
47. Garfein v. Garfein, 16 Cal. App. 3d 155, 93 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1971).
48. Id. at 150, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
49. Id.
50. There were two interesting footnotes in the court's opinion. The first was this:
The effect of the contract, obviously, was to limit plaintiff in bargaining with
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2. An Employment Contract Does Not Necessarily Create
Community Property
A corollary to the Garfein situation is presented in the fol-
lowing situation. Suppose the husband is an executive with
A&M Records in Hollywood and enjoys a handsome salary and
other benefits from his employer. Suppose further that Capitol
Records offers the husband a better deal. An employment
agreement with Capitol is signed in November 1981 calling for
the husband to become president of the company. The con-
tract calls for him to assume his position on January 2, 1982.
The contract further provides for a generous pension for the
husband whether or not his employment with Capitol goes the
full term of the contract. Assume that after a bleak Christmas
with his wife, the husband separates (December 27, 1981) and a
proceeding for the dissolution of the marriage is instituted in
the Los Angeles Superior Court in mid-1982.
Assume further that at the trial of the marital dissolution,
wife's counsel contends that the retirement benefits flowing
from the husband's contract with Capitol are community prop-
erty. It is pointed out that the husband commenced his negoti-
ations with Capitol well before the separation and that the
contract itself was also signed before the separation. Hence, it
is argued, the pension benefits were derived from employment
during marriage even though the husband did not commence
work until after separation.5 1 Counsel also argues that under
California law, particularly In re Brown, 2 a spouse's retire-
ment rights, whether or not vested, represent a property inter-
est, and to the extent such rights derive from employment
during marriage, they comprise a community asset subject to
other producers and subjected her to losing the opportunity to appear in pic-
tures for other producers, which she might regard as important to her career
or her bank account. It is immaterial, in determining the status of the con-
tract, that Paramount, in fact, did not restrict plaintiffs activities; the potential
limitation still existed.
Id. at 159 n.6, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 717 n.6.
The other was: "The duty to pay, where no picture was made, did not accrue until the
final day of each twelve-month period, since the wife was required to hold herself
available for the full period. The compensation, thus, was not 'earned' until that last
day." Id. at 160 n.7, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 717 n.7.
51. Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social Security
Benefits after Marriage of Broum and ERISA, 25 U.C.LA. L REV. 417 (1978).
52. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
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division in divorce proceedings.53
Question: How should the trial judge rule?
Answer: Under California law the Capitol retirement
benefits should be held to be the separate property
of the husband since he did not acquire a property
right to them during marriage.
Rationale: Retirement benefits are deferred consideration for
past services rendered by the employee, not gratu-
ities deriving from the beneficence of the em-
ployer. An employee begins to earn retirement
benefits when he begins performance on his job.
The husband here did not start work until after the
separation. If he had failed to appear and assume
his duties, this would have constituted a material
breach of the contract and Capitol would have
been relieved of the duty to perform its side of the
bargain. Thus, the wife acquired no property right
to the pension which is divisible in the divorce
proceedings.5
3. But Sometimes It Does
Let us now consider another aspect of the employment (and
marital) relationship where the focus is on benefits that flow
after termination of employment. In this hypothetical case, the
wife is a top-notch agent, handling many celebrities in the
movie and television industry. She is employed by a large
agency. She is also married to a screenwriter. In light of her
value to the agency, the newly renegotiated employment con-
tract between the wife and the agency has an unusual provi-
sion. It states that if the contract is terminated two years or
more after its effective date (whether by death of the agent or
by written notice of either party), the wife is to receive certain
"termination benefits." Those benefits consist of specified per-
centages of net commissions collected by the agency from the
wife's clients. Payments of the benefits are to be made on an
installment basis, extending over a five-year period, and are
subject to certain conditions relating to competitive activities
on the part of the wife.
The husband and wife separate three years after the wife's
contract is signed. A marital dissolution proceeding is filed.
53. For Nonvested Pension Rights Division, see 65 CALiF. L. REV. 275 (1977). For
Pension Rights on Dissolution, see 5 PEPPERDINE L REV. 191 (1978).
54. See In re Roesch, 83 Cal. App. 3d 96, 147 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1978).
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The husband's position is that the termination benefits repre-
sent a form of deferred compensation for services rendered
during the marriage. Thus, he claims, there is a property right
subject to division upon dissolution of the marriage. The trial
judge concludes that the termination benefits are not divisible
community property but merely an expectancy and a continua-
tion of the wife's earnings, not capable of ascertainment or val-
uation-thus of no value. It awards the benefits to the wife as
her separate property. Did the court err? In In re Skaden,5 - a
case from which facts analogous to the hypothetical were
drawn, the California Supreme Court so held.
In Skaden, the Court characterized the termination benefits
as "vested but immature", which in other words means that
the benefits survive the termination of the employee, but pay-
ments are contingent upon one or more conditions. Here, by
the terms of the agreement, the termination benefits arose two
years after the effective date of the agreement, and the parties
separated after that two-year date. Thus, the benefits were
"vested," but since there had been no employment termination
at the time of the divorce, the benefits were still "immature" in
nature.
The Supreme Court concluded that the termination rights
here did not differ in character from vested (but immature)
pension rights determined in In re Brown to be subject to divi-
sion upon divorce to the extent of their community character.
In so doing the Court rejected the notion that the termination
benefits represented "consideration for termination," the right
to which arises only upon termination. It also disagreed with
the argument that the benefits were consideration for the
agent's post-termination compliance with the conditions set
forth in the contract. The termination benefits, said the
Supreme Court, were a form of deferred compensation for
services rendered which, like pension benefits, were property
subject to division. Consequently, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the trial court, instructing it to divide the
benefits, in its sound discretion, either by ascertaining a pres-
ent value and making an equal division or adjustment accord-
ingly, or by retaining jurisdiction and supervising the later
payment of an appropriate part of every payment to each party
as it is actually made. 6
55. 19 Cal. 3d 679, 139 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1977).
56. Id. at 687-689, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 619-620.
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IV
Living Together-The Marvin Case
and Its Progeny
Lawyers and the public generally are now familiar with the
factual background of the Marvin57 case. Michelle Triola Mar-
vin, a sometime entertainer, lived with actor Lee Marvin for
seven years without marrying. All property acquired during
that period was taken in Mr. Marvin's name. Mr. Marvin sup-
ported Ms. Marvin during that time. Ultimately, however, Mr.
Marvin compelled Ms. Marvin to leave his household and sub-
sequently he refused to provide further support. Ms. Marvin
brought suit to enforce an alleged oral agreement under which
she claimed that she was entitled to one-half the property ac-
quired during the time they spent together and to support pay-
ments for her lifetime. She asserted two causes of action to
her complaint. The first sought a declaration of her contract
and property rights; the second sought to impose a construc-
tive trust upon one-half of the property acquired during the
course of the relationship.
The defendant filed a demurrer testing the legal sufficiency
of the complaint. He was unsuccessful. An answer was filed
and extensive discovery proceedings were conducted. The
case came to trial, at which time the defendant renewed his
attack on the complaint. The court granted a judgment on the
pleadings for defendant. Upon appeal to the California
Supreme Court, the plaintiff's case was reinstated.
The California Supreme Court held that while the Family
Law Act does not govern the distribution of property acquired
during a non-marital relationship, a court could enforce ex-
press contracts between non-married partners except to the
extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the considera-
tion of meretricious sexual service.58 In recognizing the chang-
57. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976); see Weitzman, Legal
Requirements of Marriage, 62 CAL. L REV. 1169 (1974); for an attack on Marvin, see 5
COMMUNITY PROP. J. 3 (1978); Marvin mentioned Bruch, Property Rights of DeFacto
Spouses, 10 FAm. LQ. 101 (1976).
58. In summary, we base our opinion on the principle that adults who volunta-
rily live together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent
as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights.
Of course, they cannot lawfully contract to pay for the performance of sexual
services, for such a contract is, in essence, an agreement for prostitution and
unlawful for that reason. But they may agree to pool their earnings and to
hold all property acquired during the relationship in accord with the law gov-
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ing social mores respecting non-marital partners, Marvin not
only removed judicial barriers to the enforcement of an ex-
press contract in a non-marital relationship, it indicated that
courts may look to a variety of other remedies in order to pro-
tect the parties' lawful (i.e., nonmeretricious) expectations.
The Supreme Court said that trial courts in such cases may
inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether
that conduct demonstrates an implied contract 9 or implied
agreement of partnership or joint venture or some other under-
standing between the parties. Where appropriate, the courts
may also employ principles of constructive trust, resulting
trust, or a theory of quantum meruit for the reasonable value
of household services rendered by a non-marital partner less
the reasonable value of support received.
After remand from the California Supreme Court, the Mar-
vin case finally went to trial. Ms. Marvin failed to prove any
contractual basis for her claim. It was also held in a second
appeal that she was not entitled to any other relief, legal or
equitable.60
In comparison, New York has not been willing to wholeheart-
edly follow California's lead. In Morone v. Morone,61 the court
declined to follow Marvin when a non-marital partner claimed
an interest in the earnings and assets of the defendant, alleg-
ing that an implied-in-fact contract had arisen from her rela-
tionship with him. The court relied on practical considerations
when it dismissed the cause of action for implied contract:
Historically, we have required the explicit and structured
understanding of an express contract and have declined to rec-
ognize a contract which is implied from the rendition and ac-
ceptance of services .... The major difficulty with implying a
erning community property; conversely they may agree that each partner's
earnings... remains the separate property of the earning partner. So long as
the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties
may order their economic affairs as they choose, and no policy precludes the
courts from enforcing such agreements.
In the present instance, plaintiff alleges that the parties agreed to pool their
earnings, that they contracted to share equally in all property acquired, and
that defendant agreed to support plaintiff. The terms of the contract as alleged
do not rest upon any unlawful consideration.
18 Cal. 3d at 674, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
59. For a discussion of implied-in-fact remedies in the context of future litigation,
see Comment, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1708 (1977).
60. Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981).
61. 50 N.Y.2d 481 (1980).
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contract from the rendition of services for one another by per-
sons living together is that it is not reasonable to infer an
agreement to pay for the services rendered when the relation-
ship of the parties makes it natural that the services were ren-
dered gratuitously .... As a matter of human experience
personal services will frequently be rendered by two people
living together because they value each other's company or be-
cause they find it a convenient or rewarding thing to do....
For courts to attempt through hindsight to sort out the inten-
tions of the parties and afflx jural significance to conduct car-
ried out within an essentially private and generally
noncontractual relationship runs too great a risk of error. Ab-
sent an express agreement, there is no frame of reference
against which to compare the testimony presented and the
character of the evidence that can be presented becomes more
evanescent. There is, therefore, substantially greater risk of
emotion-laden afterthought, not to mention fraud, in attempt-
ing to ascertain by implication what services, if any, were ren-
dered gratuitously and what compensation, if any, the parties
intended to be paid.62
The principle of the original Marvin case has continued to cap-
tivate lawyers and litigants. There have been a number of in-
stances in which application of the rationale has been sought
outside of the factual context which gave it life. Here are some
of the appellate decisions dealing with those matters.
A. Loss of Consortium
A married person whose spouse has been injured by the neg-
ligence of a third party may maintain a cause of action for loss
of consortium.63 In Tong v. Jocson,64 the plaintiff and his
fiancee commenced living together in November. The follow-
ing February they were involved in an automobile accident
when a car driven by the defendant collided with the vehicle
driven by the plaintiff. In March, plaintiff and his fiancee were
married. The following year he fied a complaint for his own
62. Id. at 488 (citations omitted). See also McCall v. Frampton, 99 Misc. 29, 159
(1979), where the court indicated that the indicia of a traditional marriage must be
present in order for a non-marital partner to support a claim to the other's earnings or
property. The court dismissed the complaint for breach of an oral contract and for a
constructive trust finding that the alleged agreement was void and unenforceable as a
matter of public policy.
63. See Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
64. 76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977).
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personal injuries together with damages for loss of consortium
arising from his (now) wife's injuries.
In considering the complaint, the court of appeals noted that
not every loss is compensable in money damages. For pur-
poses of social policy, legal causation must not become so at-
tenuated that a foreseeable injury to a legally recognized
"Marvin" relationship postulates legal liability. Thus, having
recognized the necessity for line drawing, the court held that a
cause of action for loss of consortium could not be maintained
because the injured parties were not married at the time of the
accident.65
B. Negligence by a "Marvinizer"
In Tong v. Jocson, the Marvin relationship did not support a
claim against a third party. In Planck v. Hartung,66 the tables
were turned. There, a third party was held to have no claim
against one of the Marvinizers in a negligence suit.
In Planck, plaintiff brought an action against David and Rita
for fire damages to plaintiff's condominium unit caused by
David's negligent use of a barbecue owned by Rita. At the time
of the incident, Rita and David were living together. The trial
court granted Rita a summary judgment because she had not
been negligent. Plaintiff appealed, urging that the trial court
had erred in failing to find a joint venture between David and
Rita. The Marvin case was relied upon by plaintiff in support
of that proposition.
The appellate court stated that not every cohabitation is a
"joint venture," and nothing in the Marvin case suggests other-
wise. The court declared that even if David and Rita had been
married, Rita would not be liable for David's negligence. 7
C. The Effect of An Existing Marriage on a Marvin Claim
One may ask whether the viability of a Marvin claim is af-
fected by the existence of an undissolved marriage at the time
the cohabitating parties enter into a contracted relationship.
The question is answered "possibly."
Beverly brought an action against Sam for breach of con-
65. But in New Jersey one can recover for loss of consortium. Bulloch v. United
States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 6 FAM. L. REV. 2385 (D.C.N.J. 1980).
66. 98 Cal. App. 3d 838, 159 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1979).
67. CAL. CrV. CODE § 5122 (Deering 1979).
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tract. She alleged that Sam had made a contract with her pur-
suant to which she gave up her home and job to care for Sam in
return for lifetime support and marriage. The marriage with
Sam was to take place when the children of Sam's first mar-
riage reached majority. The trial court sustained a demurrer to
the complaint on the ground that the agreement was unen-
forceable. The basis of Sam's argument was that the agree-
ment, if made, was contrary to public policy. The appellate
court determined, however, that the matter could not be deter-
mined from the face of the pleadings. It stated that such an
agreement would not violate public policy if the legitimate ob-
jects of Sam's marriage had already been destroyed. The com-
plaint alleged that Sam was already separated from his wife at
the time he made the alleged agreement with Beverly. Thus,
the appellate court held that the trial court had erred in sus-
taining the demurrer.
These were the facts and ruling in Feldman v. Nassi.68 In
evaluating the strength or weakness of a claim under the Mar-
vin theory, the Feldman case emphasizes that counsel must
make an exhaustive evaluation of the personal history of both
clients in order to render a well reasoned opinion on the pros-
pects of litigation.
D. The Wrongful Death Action
The full circle of possible claims under a Marvin theory is
drawn closer by a consideration of the following hypothetical
situation: Paula is a motion picture actress. She has been liv-
ing in Bel Air with Garry, an aspiring cinematographer. They
are engaged to be married. The parties pool their earnings
while living together and they have agreed to share equally all
property accumulated during their relationship. They have
purchased their Bel Air residence, taking title in both names.
Each contributed to the down payment and each agreed to con-
tribute to the trust deed payments. Paula is on location in San
Francisco for the filming of her latest picture. On her return
from location to Los Angeles, she is killed in an airplane crash.
Garry consults an attorney to determine whether he may bring
a wrongful death claim against the airline. The holding in Har-
rod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc.69 indicates that Garry
68. 111 Cal. App. 3d 881, 169 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1980).
69. 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981) (Los Angeles trial court held that
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has no cause of action.
The appellate court in Harrod declared that a cause of action
for wrongful death is purely a statutory remedy and Garry is
not within the class of persons who may bring an action for
wrongful death under California's wrongful death statute. °
The court also rejected the argument that to exclude Garry
from the class of persons entitled to sue for wrongful death de-
nied him equal protection of the laws.71 The court's descrip-
tion of Garry as a "meretricious spouse" also suggests that
despite Marvin v. Marvin, not all courts or all people are com-
fortable with the idea of non-marital arrangements.
The federal courts came to the same determination as in
Harrod, concluding that the Marvin case does not expand on
any statutory definition of "heir" under California law.72
E. Other Issues
The proliferation of non-marital arrangements means
greater concern for lawyers counselling one or another of the
parties in these relationships. Certainly, not all of the possible
concerns have been settled. For example, a number of tax
questions present themselves, including the following: Is a de-
pendency exemption available for a working partner? Is a
working partner entitled to claim head of household status? Is
"support" to a nonworking partner treated as "alimony" by the
supporting spouse or is it a nondeductible personal expense?
Is such support a "gift" to the recipient? Is a transfer of prop-
erty between the partners a taxable event? What are the death
tax implications of succession by one partner to property of a
deceased partner? These and other matters, including the
there is no standing to sue for wrongful death). 4 CA.. FAM. L REP., February 18, 1980,
at 1.
70. CAL. C. Crv. P. § 377.
71. The Legislature could reasonably conclude a relationship which the par-
ties have chosen not to formalize by marriage lacks the necessary permanence
to allow the survivor to recover damages for wrongful death-damages which
look to the future and are intended to compensate for future loss. In addition,
an action based on a meretricious relationship presents greater problems of
proof and dangers of fraudulent claims than an action by a spouse or putative
spouse. Finally, the exclusion of meretricious spouses is reasonably related to
the state's legitimate interest in promoting marriage (Vogel v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., supra, 450 F. Supp. 224, 226). Section 337 does not deny
Harrod equal protection of the laws.
118 Cal. App. 3d at 158, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
72. Aspinall v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 625 F.2d 325 (1980).
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preparation of detailed contractual agreements between non-
marital partners, will continue to occupy the time and atten-
tion of lawyers in this burgeoning area of practice.73
V
Conclusion
The members of the entertainment industry share most of
the same personal problems which burden employees in other
businesses and professions. When marital difficulties arise,
concerns about custody of children, financial matters and the
like are as common to the insurance company office employee
and taxicab driver as to the celebrity actor. There are, how-
ever, some issues which arise with greater frequency in the di-
vorce of a member of the entertainment industry than are
experienced in other lines of work. The lawyer who practices
in this area of law will want to keep abreast of the latest devel-
opments. Creative minds will continue to enlarge the variety
of subjects which litigants, lawyers and courts must deal with
to properly serve this part of our community.
73. Many of these tax issues have been discussed in Zola, Tax Implications of
Living Together- Close Encounters of the Uncertain Kind, 15 BEv. HILS B.J. 450
(1981).

